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Abstract
Literature on war and the environment has examined a
wide range of militarized landscapes, but massive fortiﬁca-
tion systems such as the Maginot or Siegfried lines, which
are symbols of a military trend in vogue during the interwar
period, have largely been ignored. These military walls in-
terwove natural and national values and constituted mas-
sive landscape interventions, aimed at reinforcing political
borders, embedded in—and relying upon—geographical
features. This article examines a late example of this trend:
the fortiﬁcation of the Pyrenees border that the Spanish
dictatorship carried out during the 1940s. Particularly after
the liberation of France in 1944, the Francoist regime en-
gaged in a serious effort to build a fortiﬁcation system in
the Pyrenees, fearing a potential invasion; by the early
1950s, several thousands of bunkers formed what became
the Pyrenees Line. Through these efforts, the Francoist
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army attempted to convert what Spanish fascists regarded
as a spiritual wall—the political border with France—into a
truly physical separation. Today, the remaining fortiﬁca-
tions are material ruins of the Spanish isolation after the
Second World War, when the Francoist regime closed in on
itself, until the Cold War, when Francisco Franco became a
US ally. Altogether, the case of the militarization of the
Pyrenees shows how walls, fences, and other forms of forti-
ﬁcation can be a fertile ground for environmental history
to explore the mix of culture and nature as well as the polit-
ical implications of the concept of natural borders.
DEFENSE LINES, BORDERS, AND NATURE
On the final days of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), fascist poet
and soldier Ernesto Gimenez Caballero was at the head of the trium-
phant Francoist military units occupying Catalonia. As the troops
reached the Pyrenees border, following on the heels of the fleeing
loyalist army, one of the first prophets of fascism in Spain went into
ecstasy.1 He called the Francoist victory a “seismic movement in
History,” one that would return the Pyrenees—“a spiritual mountain
range”—to its position as a healthy division between France and
Spain.2 In the view of the Spanish fascists, French ideological influen-
ces had debilitated the true essence of imperial Spain since 1700
when, upon the crowning of his grandson Philip V as king of Spain,
Louis XIV of France had allegedly stated: “The Pyrenees are no more”
(“Il n’y a plus de Pyrenees”), thereby seemingly erasing the political sig-
nificance of the mountains.3 Nearly 250 years later, the Francoist oc-
cupation of the Pyrenees inspired Gimenez Caballero to publish an
account, which he titled (in direct response to the French king):
“There are the Pyrenees!” (“¡Hay Pirineos!”).4
By the mid-twentieth century, Gimenez Caballero’s jubilant dream
for the Pyrenees had materialized in unexpected forms. Scattered
along the Spanish side of the Pyrenean border, from the Bay of Biscay
to the Mediterranean and ranging to a depth of sixty kilometers from
the frontier, approximately 4,500 fortifications, built on the top of
hills and cliffs, stood guard over roads and valleys—the result of a
vast project conceived early after the Civil War and secretly put into
use as the collapse of the Axis armies approached in 1944. Although
these fortifications of the so-called Pyrenees Line were the subject of
discussion at the United Nations in 1946 and were analyzed by the
US Joint Chief of Staff in 1947, they began to fall into oblivion after
the consolidation of the Cold War and the 1953 Pact of Madrid,
which signaled the rapprochement between Spain and the United
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States. The US military, after all, was interested in building naval and
air bases in the Iberian Peninsula, not in obsolete field defenses along
the French border. In 1959, General Francisco Franco, the former dev-
otee of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, toured the streets of
Madrid accompanied by Dwight Eisenhower, the first US president
ever to visit Spain, while Gimenez Caballero, the once-admired poet
and recently appointed ambassador to the Latin American republic of
Paraguay, had become an uncomfortable reminder of the fascist
heyday.
Although short-lived, the Pyrenees Line constituted a late example
of a military trend much in vogue during the interwar period.5 The
Maginot and Siegfried defense lines, in France and Germany respec-
tively, are probably the most famous examples of the fortification fe-
ver that took Europe by storm.6 These colossal military walls
constituted massive landscape interventions aimed at reinforcing po-
litical borders, embedded in—and relying upon—geographical fea-
tures regarded as obstacles under the prevailing military doctrine
prior to the Second World War. Growing out of the muddy trenches
of the First World War, these neat fortification systems inextricably
mixed nature with culture, forests with concrete, and mountains
with steel. Guarding the national borders, disguised in the landscape,
they were often seen as embodying the natural values of the home-
land. However, when they were finally put to the test, they proved of
little use in a new war based on the mechanization of warfare, and
most failed to accomplish their purpose.
Fortifications—from simple walls and forts to the imposing
Maginot Line—have been used to create, mark, or reinforce social
and political borders, often relying on geographical and landscape
features. But, above all else, they have been erected, developed, and
perfected to prevent the entry of those regarded as being undesirable.
“Fortress Europe,” for example, widely used today as a critical allusion
to the European system of migrant detention centers and border
patrols, was originally a term for the 1940s German fortifications
built in occupied Europe to prevent Allied landings.7 The Pyrenees
Line served the same multiple purposes, intended to protect Spain
from military invasion and to clearly delineate Spanish cultural and
political boundaries.
By examining the symbolic and material development of the
Francoist Pyrenees Line, this article contributes to the historiography
of twentieth-century Spain, the Francoist regime, and the growing lit-
erature on war and environment.8 First, it explores the construction
of fortification systems as militarized landscapes, underlining the use
of discourses interweaving nature and nation and the importance of
social control. Second, in providing a Spanish case study, it contrib-
utes to the literature on the environmental history of war with signifi-
cance beyond the European context, as demonstrated by the close
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attention that US military planners devoted to the region during the
early Cold War.9
Francoist Spain’s border with France was fortified first through rhe-
toric that made the Pyrenees a natural and spiritual bastion separat-
ing the country from the degeneration of liberal democracy. But the
case of the Pyrenees also illustrates that in order to fulfill the main
aim of a fortification project—that is, breaking the socioecological
continuum—control over people and space was at least as important
as the capability to design and build a system of defenses and
bunkers. As put by Marco Armiero in his study of the Italian moun-
tains, it could be said that Francoism changed the Pyrenees “with
words and with bombs,” sculpting a whole region as a battlefield for a
war that did not occur in the end.10
NATURAL OBSTACLE, SPIRITUAL EARTHQUAKE
The Pyrenean mountain range extends for almost 500 kilometers,
separating the Iberian Peninsula from the rest of continental Europe.
From the Mediterranean Sea to the Bay of Biscay, several peaks exceed
3,000 meters and form a geographical feature of great historical and
symbolic meaning, containing one of the first national parks estab-
lished in Spain.11 Nonetheless, beyond its cultural significance, the
Pyrenees are not a homogeneous unit. The 200-kilometer-long cen-
tral region of the massif, between the Roncal and Segre rivers, aver-
ages more than 2,000 meters in elevation and marks a fairly clear line
between the northern and southern climate and biota. On the two
extremes of the Pyrenees, however, the situation is fairly different.
Neither the western nor the eastern Pyrenees represent considerable
obstacles, nor do they constitute a sharp separation between climatic
or biotic regions. The lowest mountain pass of the massif, the Col du
Perthus, connects southern France with Catalonia at an elevation of
290 meters. Accordingly, these regions at the eastern and western
ends of the Pyrenees are more permeable, and they have experienced
the frequent circulation of peoples and influences as well as of
armies.12
Today, as in 1939, the political border in force in the region goes
back to the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees, which put an end to the
French–Spanish wars of the previous decades. After a revolt in
Catalonia in 1640, French troops helped the rebels to defeat the
Spanish army and took control of the region.13 The 1659 treaty sanc-
tioned the French annexation of the territories north of the Pyrenees
and thus modified the eastern part of the border. However, it took
more than two centuries to formally establish, delimit, and enforce
the border’s precise demarcation on the ground. In parallel, the new
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political border, and the differences it established on each of its sides,
contributed to the slow formation of two national identities.14
By 1939, almost three centuries later, the newly born Francoist re-
gime coveted the French colonial possessions in northern Africa but
showed few signs of quarreling over the older borders with France.15
However, the fascist celebration of the Pyrenees’ spiritual reemer-
gence that was encapsulated in Gimenez Caballero’s words, “There
are the Pyrenees!” represented an explicit rejection of liberal Europe,
which was shared by many Francoist supporters.16 “Spain is not
Europe, it never was,” claimed General Alfredo Kindelan, one of the
top officers of the Spanish army. In the pages of the prominent mili-
tary publication Ejercito, he argued that Spain was a small continent
in itself, separated from Europe by an almost insurmountable barrier:
the Pyrenees. His views display the significant influence that
National-Socialist notions of geopolitics enjoyed among part of the
Spanish military. Kindelan argued that the Spanish nation configured
“an exceptional geopolitical subject,” featuring a substantial unity in
weather, orography, customs, and race. In his opinion, in the late
eighteenth century, France had infected Spain with the virus of revo-
lution through the Pyrenees border, but after a century and a half of
illness, the shock therapy of the Spanish Civil War had cleansed the
body of the Spanish nation. Once sanitized, the nation was ready to
attain its geopolitical “vital space.”17
Despite initially adopting a neutral position during the Second
World War, Spain declared itself non-belligerent amid the French
downfall of June 1940. This position involved support for the Axis
forces but not a direct involvement in military operations. As Paris
fell to the Nazis, Francoist forces occupied the Tangier international
zone in northern Morocco as a temporary wartime measure and laid
claims over Gibraltar. However, no further escalation followed, and
Franco did not enter the war despite extensive collaboration with
Italy and Germany.18 Its most symbolic intervention was probably
the Blue Division (“Division Azul”), a unit of 50,000 volunteers that
became a German army division and fought in the Eastern front start-
ing in the summer of 1941. The course of the war frustrated Spanish
colonial ambitions in northern Africa, but the view of the Pyrenees as
a “natural border” endured, permeating school textbooks and cinema
productions.19 As a Spanish schoolbook explained in 1943, God had
placed the Pyrenees as a natural border to “separate us eternally from
freethinking France.”20
As the tide of the Second World War turned against the Axis forces
and the Spanish regime, Francoist officials became uneasy. The over-
sized Spanish army—close to 500,000 mobilized men—was a giant
with feet of clay, lacking access to modern equipment, fuel, motor-
ized vehicles, and air power. In this context, military theorists clung
to the theoretical advantages that a mountain landscape offered.
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According to views widely held in their circles at the time, mountains
and forests could compensate for the lack of armored divisions and
even air power. Making a virtue of necessity, military theorists argued
that in case of war the Spanish armed forces had to make the best of
its landscape and enhance its natural qualities when possible.21
Accordingly, the defensive potential of Spain’s nature ranked high
among its national attributes. In the Pyrenees, Gimenez Caballero
saw a representation of the Spanish nation.22 As the main Francoist
newspaper put it in early 1944, nature had favored Spain with the
masculine side of the Pyrenees—arid, rocky, uncomfortable, apt for
mountaineers, and good for defense—whereas the French side was
feminine, deemed fit for tourists, and without defensive value.23
Along with this celebration came an emphasis on the virtues of the
Spanish soldier, who must exploit the advantages granted by his land
despite lacking modern equipment. Naturally, images combining
mountain landscapes with stoic Spanish soldiers are featured in the
military press of the period (see figure 1). Well into the 1940s, during
a conference on the strategic value of the border, a general and mili-
tary professor underlined that the Spanish armed forces had to adapt
to the national terrain. The defining characteristic of the Spanish ge-
ography, as he put it in front of the future top commanders of the
army, was encapsulated in the prefix “anti”: “Nature has indelibly
inscribed this spirit in our geography, which is almost completely
anti-tank, anti-aircraft, anti-airlift and, maybe, anti-atomic.”24
In the eyes of high-ranked Francoist officers, it was this natural su-
periority of Spain’s topography that the French—“our neighbors on
the other side of the Rif and the Pyrenees”—had intended to wipe
out. They noted that the French adopted different approaches to
these mountainous divides. While, in Morocco, the French built few
connecting roads, in the Pyrenees, they promoted interconnection
with Spain, with no fewer than seventeen roads and four railroads
crisscrossing the border. “France certainly wanted to level the
Pyrenees,” they concluded.25 In order to reverse this trend, Francoist
authorities cancelled road and train projects aimed at improving con-
nections with France and mocked the incipient tourist development
of the border region, which was eventually abandoned.26 Top-
ranking officials actually celebrated the lack of a good transportation
infrastructure in Spain, regarding it as an advantage in case of
conflict.27
Yet, despite their faith in the natural virtues of the Spanish geogra-
phy, military planners were not blind to the differences in the
Pyrenees mountain range. They conceded that on each side of the
massif a door swung open, a weakness aggravated by the regions in-
volved: the Basque Country and Navarra in the west and Catalonia in
the east. As one Francoist general put it, on each side of the Pyrenees’
natural bastion grew “poisonous plants” that periodically threatened
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the social, moral, and political virtues of Spain.28 After the end of the
Spanish Civil War in 1939, the military occupation of these regions
came hand in hand with an effort to seal off the border and insulate
Spain from foreign influences. Imagining the Pyrenees as a potential
theatre of war, the military intervened to enhance the defensive fea-
tures of the landscape, building fortifications as a way of reinforcing
nature. Yet, to transform the Pyrenees into the solid separation that
Francoism yearned for, the Spanish regime had to change not only its
landscape but also its people.
PERFECTING NATURE THROUGHWORK
Military officers and Francoist ideologues believed that the fortifica-
tions erected along the Pyrenees border had both spiritual and natu-
ral foundations. But the mortar that hardened these defenses was
political violence and social control. The Francoist victory in 1939
gave birth to a “New Spain” where there was no space for political op-
position. The new regime aimed at pulling the weeds out by the root;
at least 130,000 political opponents were executed during the
Figure 1. Cover of the Spanish military magazine Ejercito, no. 115 (August 1949). Credit: Biblioteca
Virtual del Ministerio de Defensa (http://bibliotecavirtualdefensa.es).
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Spanish Civil War, plus 20,000 more in the years that followed.29
Autarky, the socioeconomic system championed during the first years
of the Francoist dictatorship, advocated top-down self-sufficiency,
which was closely associated with tight social control and privileged
military expenditure.30 Although military operations finished in
1939, the state of war remained in force until as late as 1948, ensuring
the absolute prevalence of the army over civil authorities.31 In the
border region, where the Spanish Maquis—the guerrilla resistance
against Franco—endured and became particularly active between
1944 and 1948, the boundaries between war and post-war were even
more blurred.32
Organizing a defense line and preparing a future battlefield first
meant imposing tight control over the space in dispute. The regula-
tion of movement was a central part of this process. Francoist author-
ities legally established a “frontier zone” where safe-conduct
documents were mandatory for anyone circulating out of his or her
town of residence. Although the exact limits of this strip of territory
kept changing, it reached up to a depth of eighty kilometers from the
border. The safe-conduct document was required to use any public or
private transport in this area, and anyone stopped without carrying a
valid and stamped document was to be fined and could be arrested.
Activities such as hunting and tree cutting were controlled. The
“frontier zone” and its legal requirements remained in force until as
late as 1955.33
Sanitizing the border region by getting rid of those individuals
regarded as suspicious was part and parcel of its militarization.
Thousands of people had already gone into exile when the war fin-
ished. Yet anyone who had served a prison sentence faced enormous
difficulties if she was to set her residence inside the limits of the fron-
tier zone, and those listed as politically unreliable were legally ban-
ished from this area repeatedly. At the very same time, thousands of
soldiers and officers occupied the region during the 1940s. Lacking
garrisons, troops inhabited vacant spaces and buildings, while officers
usually lived in private houses.34 The very efforts of fortification were
one more layer of military occupation, a permanent materialization
of their authority in the territory. The presence of military forces also
contributed to the obstruction of the Spanish Maquis moving into
the region from France, who reported the activity of Francoist troops
throughout the border landscape and made efforts to get hold of
forged safe-conduct passes.35
The building of fortifications thus became intertwined with mili-
tary occupation and social control. Work started as soon as the
Spanish Civil War finished, and these construction projects made use
of one of the few abundant and cheap resources of autarkic Spain: la-
bor power.36 Militarized units of political prisoners participated in
public works and reconstruction projects all over the country, but, in
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the border region, some also engaged in building fortifications and
military infrastructure, usually very close to the border line. In 1939
and 1940, 7,800 prisoners worked on these projects in the Basque re-
gion, under very poor material conditions, while approximately
3,800 did so in Catalonia.37 These early efforts were not part of an in-
tegral plan and stopped around 1941; most military engineers during
these years were busy fortifying the region of Gibraltar and North
Africa instead.
The course of the Second World War forcibly changed the priorities
of the Francoist regime. In late 1943, Franco abandoned the ambiva-
lent “non-belligerent” position and returned to neutrality while an-
nouncing the withdrawal of the Blue Division from the Eastern front.
Survival for the regime was to become the top priority. Around this
time, the Spanish chief of staff established directives for the fortifica-
tion of the Pyrenees. These directives certified the military’s trust in
the terrain by classifying territories into three categories—A, B, and
C—according to its orography and the communications that crossed
it. High mountain passes were regarded as “passive” areas (C), where
field fortifications and military patrols would suffice, whereas flat
regions with good communications and roads were considered criti-
cal spaces (A) that required all kinds of fortification efforts (see
figures 2 and 3).38 In other words, it was the terrain that determined
the effort of fortification needed.39
Early in 1944, disguised as civilians, senior officers travelled through
the region categorizing the lands under these typologies and deter-
mining the locations where the “natural obstacles” should be rein-
forced with fortifications. They also accounted for the local resources
and defense possibilities of each area.40 As Nazi-occupied France col-
lapsed during the summer of 1944 and the infiltration of Spanish
Maquis with experience in the French resistance increased, fears of in-
vasion haunted the Francoists.41 On August 23, 1944, right before the
liberation of Paris by the Allies, the Spanish chief of staff signed an or-
der setting in motion an integral project of fortification for the border
region with France.42 Less than two months later, in October 1944,
the Spanish Maquis launched an ambitious operation to occupy the
Val d’Aran, the only Spanish valley situated on the Atlantic watershed
of the Pyrenees. Despite being rapidly defeated by the Francoist army,
this operation seemed to confirm the fears of Francoist officials regard-
ing external attacks.43 By the end of 1944, several regiments of engi-
neers had been deployed in the border region along with other
military units, and works were underway.44
In contrast to previous fortification works, it was regular conscript
soldiers who bore the brunt of the building effort after 1944, with no
prisoners taking part.45 Quite significantly, however, Franco
appointed as the head engineer of the Pyrenees fortification system
the colonel who had devised and directed the vast system of forced
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labor throughout Spain.46 Juan Petrirena, a veteran military engineer
with experience in the colonial war in Morocco and the Civil War, or-
ganized the conscript labor.47 Under his guidance, the hobbled metab-
olism of autarkic Spain started pumping tons and tons of concrete,
along with thousands of soldiers, to the Pyrenees to bring the ambi-
tious plans to fruition.48 In the following years, the physical work of
conscript soldiers transformed the borderlands and became inscribed
on the landscape in the form of reinforced concrete bunkers.49
Lacking machinery and fuel, the work that concealed hundreds of
defenses and shelters throughout the Spanish border was largely man-
ual. Unlike the massive fortification systems undertaken by France or
Germany during the interwar period and the Second World War, the
efforts of the Spanish army were those of a low-energy society relying
almost completely on the labor of both animals and humans. The
military transported building materials to the border region first by
railway and then to the main towns by truck. However, on the final
stretch of the journey to the fortification sites, animal draught still
remained essential. As pointed out by a former lieutenant deployed
in the region, “a mule was a treasure”, and the injuries and deaths of
animals usually led to long legal enquiries against the officers in
charge.50 Conscript soldiers, who were more abundant and less val-
ued, substituted for animal draught when mules were not available,
as was often the case, and working days could extend from ten to
fourteen hours.51 Several former conscripts recalled the work condi-
tions as dire; they were badly equipped for work, especially in moun-
tain environments, and had limited food available. Fearing
encounters with guerrillas, armed sentinels oversaw the work, and
officers sometimes hid their own rank insignias to prevent Maquis
from distinguishing them from regular soldiers.52
In order to make up for the limited technology available and the
quality of the fortifications themselves, military officers placed great
emphasis on embedding the fortifications in the Pyrenees landscape.
When giving detailed building instructions, military directives on pa-
per and officers on the ground highlighted the importance of
“imitating nature” by concealing bunkers in the terrain through exca-
vating caves and galleries so that the fortifications would become part
of the landscape.53 Creating structures that mimicked nature was
only part of the goal; officers encouraged soldiers to take advantage
of the protection and concealment nature already provided. Military
publications of the time portrayed mountain environments as the
best allies of the Spanish soldier and explicitly associated the features
of the mountains—rough, brave, hard—with Spanish racial traits.54
Many of the shelters were excavated in rock, and others imitated nat-
ural features as well as shepherd huts and terracing walls in the
hillsides.55
Environmental History 0 (October 2018)12
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/envhis/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/envhis/em
y051/5091299 by guest on 07 Septem
ber 2018
Along the border, the structure of the fortification system was based
on “resistance centers,” following the A, B, and C categories estab-
lished in 1943, that were intended to defend themselves autono-
mously. With the exception of a few advanced fortifications, these
resistance centers were not placed right on the border but, rather, in-
side Spanish territory, covering the main lines of penetration. Certain
valleys and regions directly bordering the French territory—like the
one chosen by the Spanish Maquis for their failed invasion in late
1944—were considered indefensible and therefore not covered by the
fortification system. Each resistance center was assigned the defense of
a specific area and was composed of several types of fortifications,
from large anti-tank bunkers to small machine-gun pillboxes or shel-
ters, among others. Before work slowed down in 1948, most of the
military effort was concentrated in the areas along the main roads and
penetration lines, where the density of the completed bunkers was re-
markable.56 On the other hand, most of the fortifications planned for
passive zones, where the natural obstacles were regarded as insur-
mountable, remained only on paper. As a result of the military’s faith
in terrain, the distribution of the fortifications constructed through-
out the border region became quite unequal. Few bunkers were built
in the higher mountain passes, while significant concentrations of for-
tifications were placed in valleys that were regarded as strategic and
also along the main penetration lines (see figures 4 and 5).
AN INCOMPLETE PROJECT: A COLD
WAR STORY
In early 1946, an incident between France and Spain increased the
tension in the border region. Cristino Garcıa Granda, a member of
the Spanish Maquis and also a hero of the French resistance, was
arrested in Madrid and sentenced to death. Despite the protests of the
French government, he was executed on February 21, 1946. In re-
sponse, the French government ordered the border with Spain closed,
and international condemnations against Francoist Spain grew.57 A
few weeks later, in early April 1946, Oskar Lange, the Polish represen-
tative in the United Nations (UN)—which Spain had not been invited
to join—petitioned the UN Security Council to study the situation in
Spain. Keeping Franco in power, noted Lange, was creating interna-
tional tensions. One of the reasons he used was the militarization of
the border region, and he highlighted the presence of thousands of
soldiers and the erection of fortifications.58
As a result of the Polish petition, a subcommittee on the so-called
“Spanish Question” was formed to look into the activities of the
Francoist regime. Not only did it find evidence of Francoist support of
the Axis powers during the war, but it also gathered information on
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the fortifications built in the Pyrenees. The memorandums provided
by the British, American, and French governments stated that the for-
tifications in the Pyrenees were of a defensive nature.59 However, on
the basis of all of the information collected by the end of 1946, the
UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that Francoism
was a “fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result
of aid received from, Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist
Italy.”60 The declaration recommended UN members to take diplo-
matic action and keep Spain away from international institutions un-
til an acceptable government was formed. The Francoist regime
responded to this diplomatic isolation by increasing military mobili-
zation and declared itself ready to confront foreign intervention, as
graphically shown in some of the military publications of the time
(see figure 6).
During the following years, as the Cold War unfolded, US military
planners carefully examined the European theatre. Successive reports
produced by the US Joint Intelligence Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) in 1946 and 1947 underlined the critical strategic value of the
Pyrenees region in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe,
Figure 6. Cover of the Spanish military magazine Ejercito, no. 87 (April 1947). Credit: Biblioteca Virtual
del Ministerio de Defensa (http://bibliotecavirtualdefensa.es).
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conceding that the Red armies would probably occupy the continent
and reach the Pyrenees rapidly. Lacking aerial support, the JCS judged
that neither the mountain range nor the Spanish army would repre-
sent a serious obstacle, concluding that the Soviet army could cross
the Pyrenees in twenty days and reach Gibraltar in forty more days,
easily overrunning the large, but ill-equipped, Spanish army and its
outdated fortifications.61
After 1948, the efforts of the Francoist army to build fortifications
in the Pyrenees decreased. Most of the anti-tank bunkers had been
completed and the state of war in Spain was finally at an end.62
Around this time, and after suffering heavy losses, the Spanish
Communist Party also started reconsidering the guerrilla strategy,
and France reopened its border with Spain.63 As the Cold War alli-
ances became defined, Spanish propaganda presented the Iberian
Peninsula as an island of security and Franco as the first general who
had defeated communism. The growing tensions of the Cold War
contributed to a progressive change of the US position towards Spain,
whose strategic value and collaboration was now deemed to be criti-
cal by military planners.64 However, this value did not reside in the
strength of the Pyrenees as a natural border but, instead, in the poten-
tial role of the peninsula “as a site for air and naval bases from which
to control the western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches.”65
The slow but constant rapprochement between the United States and
Spain culminated in 1953 with the Pact of Madrid, which allowed the
United States to build several naval and air bases in Spain in exchange
for economic and military aid but left the fortifications untouched.
The diplomatic agreement ended the period of Spanish isolation and
facilitated Spain’s incorporation into the UN two years later, al-
though Spain remained out of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).66
During the 1950s, the tight control exerted by the military in the
border region slowly eased. The compulsory use of safe-conduct docu-
ments was lifted in 1955, the same year that the Spanish government
approved the creation of a second national park in the Pyrenees.67
The remaining units of engineers devoted most of their efforts to
maintaining and perfecting the fortifications’ camouflage, policing
logging, and regularly patrolling the region.68 By the late 1950s,
when the fortification project was abandoned, approximately 4,500
different defenses and shelters had been built throughout the border
zone.69 The stability granted by the new international status of the
dictatorship, along with an economic crisis, brought political
changes. In 1959, a new Francoist government shelved the autarkic
policies, which had been in decline since 1951, and approved the so-
called Stabilization Plan. This coincided with the breakthrough of
tourism, which became probably the most symbolic banner of
Spanish liberalization.70 In 1960, as the military units of engineers
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that had scattered bunkers throughout the border finally disbanded,
the Spanish government published its first official studies for the
touristic organization of the Pyrenees.71 Some of the road and com-
munication projects that had been abandoned in 1939 would be re-
sumed for tourism purposes.72
In the following years, the urban developments required to im-
prove access and grant accommodation to the growing numbers of
visitors to the Catalan coast or the expanding ski resorts of the
Pyrenees inevitably led to clashes with regional military authorities,
as they exposed fortification buildings or rendered them inoperable.
Starting in the 1960s, a new wave of concrete covered the Catalan
coast, this time in the form of urbanization. In the mountains, the
construction of new houses sometimes obstructed fortification firing
lines, raising the opposition of local military authorities.73
The building of roads and the growth of the Spanish economy has
had other dramatic consequences in the Pyrenees. Starting in the
mid-1950s, the slow process of depopulation in the mountain range,
which has been ongoing since the late nineteenth century, acceler-
ated dramatically.74 As in other mountainous regions of the
Mediterranean, the population loss has brought with it the abandon-
ment of agricultural activity on the slopes of the many valleys, and
forests have grown rapidly during the following decades.75 When the
Spanish army carried out a general revision of the state of the fortifi-
cations between 1969 and 1971, officers and conscript soldiers strug-
gled to find many of them. Some had already been eaten up by the
forests, while others were exposed by roads or ski resorts and even
flooded by newly built reservoirs.76
CONCLUSIONS
When Spain finally joined both NATO and the European Union in
1986, international commentators blew the dust off the old meta-
phors to announce—one more time—that the Pyrenees had ceased to
represent a separation between Spain and Europe. The last revision of
the fortification structures built along the border, carried out as a mil-
itary exercise, took place that very same year.77 Several of the old
bunkers, never occupied by the army or legally expropriated, had
been taken over by local inhabitants who used them as warehouses or
livestock pens, and some were familiar to local hikers. During the
1990s, projects aiming to conserve some of them started up.78
As contemporary ruins, these bunkers are testimonies of the shift-
ing political and economic regimes and their national projects of
transformation.79 Today, many of Franco’s pillboxes are gone, dev-
oured by forests, flooded by reservoirs, buried by tourist-oriented ur-
ban development, or razed to the ground by new roads and the high
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velocity railway connecting Barcelona with Paris. The remaining
structures are material ruins of Spain’s isolation after the Second
World War. They are a symbol of the autarkic years of Francoism,
which closed in on itself when its German and Italian counterparts
were defeated and when Cold War urgencies converted Franco into a
US ally. The Francoist project of fortification was an attempt to con-
vert what Spanish fascists regarded as a spiritual wall—the political
border with France—into a truly material separation, thereby perfect-
ing a natural obstacle—the Pyrenees—by building defenses and shel-
ters with different forms of forced labor. The thousands of bunkers
constructed were part of an effort to correct “nature’s mistakes,” en-
hancing the defensive features of the landscape. It was not possible to
make the Pyrenees taller, but thousands of tons of concrete were
poured to make them into a stronger barrier, despite the resounding
failure of the fortification systems during the Second World War. As
shown by the celebration of mountain landscapes and environments
that accompanied the fortification of the Pyrenees, the militarization
of the border created “a hybrid environment in which the nationali-
zation of nature was particularly strong.”80 The progressive abandon-
ment of the autarkic political economy and the liberalization of the
Spanish economy, which is often symbolized by its emergence as a
tourist destination, were accompanied by a reduction of the military
role along the border and the final abandonment of the project.
The militarization of the Spanish border with France demonstrated
how ideological premises concerning nation and nature transformed
the landscape of the Pyrenees together with social control and the
material construction of fortifications. Sealing off the border required
taking care of the “social weeds” as much as it did building a wall dis-
guised in the landscape. The military occupation of space established
a layer of control over movement and economic activity and cleansed
the region through repression and banishments. The bunkers, on
which human and animal work were clearly inscribed, were erected
on top of these layers of control. They remain among the last visible,
material records of the history of military occupation in the region.
Writing in 1939, fascist poet Gimenez Caballero asserted that if
Spanish history had to be summarized in one sentence, it should be:
“To have or not to have the Pyrenees.”81 In September 1940, a very
different visitor arrived in the town of Portbou, the same place where
Gimenez Caballero had announced the reemergence of the “spiritual
mountain range.” Fleeing the Nazi occupation of Europe, Walter
Benjamin reached Spain with a group of Jewish refugees to find that
the Francoist government had cancelled their transit visas and that
police had orders to return the migrants to France. Fearing deporta-
tion, he committed suicide on September 27, 1940.82
Although the Pyrenees Line is no longer a functioning obstacle to
movement of people and ideas, in the late 1990s Spain built another
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wall. As part of the new “Fortress Europe,” the reinforced fences
around Ceuta and Melilla, some of the last Spanish settlements in
Africa, have been erected to prevent migrants from coming into
Europe.83 Walls, fences, and other forms of urban and military fortifi-
cation remain tools for exclusion and marginalization. Their historical
foundations are fertile ground for environmental historians to criti-
cally explore the mix of culture and nature and the political implica-
tions of the concept of natural borders and militarized landscapes.
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